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Statutorily Implied Federal Causes of
Action After Merrill Lynch: How Sad it
is; How Simple it Could Be
John A. Maher*
Joan Dawley Maher**
I. Introduction
How sad it is,' in the context of a constitutionally limited federal judiciary's evolution of the "implied cause of action,"' to encounter a judge's lament that the Supreme Court "has told us how
to seek intimations sufficient to read statutory silence as affirmative
or negative." Judge Rubin, however, did not address the canons of
statutory construction oriented to resolving ambiguity. He referred
to the policy and application problems peculiar to claims that given
federal statutes permit inferences of congressional intent to create
private rights of action, although Congress was either completely si* Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law; A.B., University of Notre Dame, LL.B. &
LL.M. (Trade Regulation), New York University.
** Staff Attorney, Pennsylvania Securities Commission; A.B., University of the State of
N.Y.; J.D., Dickinson School of Law.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the many contributions of Janice C. Berman, Esq.,
J.D. 1983, Dickinson School of Law, Linda T. Cox, Esq., J.D. 1984, Dickinson School of Law
and Ms. Jacqueline K. Bashaar, cand. J.D. 1985, Dickinson School of Law. Ms. Maher's participation in preparing this article was independent of her performance of duties for and on
behalf of the Pennsylvania Securities Commission. The Pennsylvania Securities Commission,
as a matter of policy, disclaims any responsibility for any publication by any of its members or
staff. The views expressed herein are shared by Ms. Maher and are not to be attributed in any
particular to the Pennsylvania Securities Commission or her colleagues therein.
I. Apologies to a great commentator on American social themes, Jackie Gleason.
2. On the one hand, federal courts are, by definition, courts of limited jurisdiction. On
the other hand, most state courts of record and original jurisdiction are courts of general jurisdiction. They have jurisdiction of a controversy absent a showing to the contrary. The party
seeking jurisdiction of a federal court has the burden of rebutting the presumption that it lacks
jurisdiction. See generally, WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 17-62 (3d ed. 1976). When
considering power to deal with federal questions, the crucible in which implied causes of action
have evolved, one must remember that Congress did not confer general original jurisdiction
over federal questions on federal courts until 1875. 18 STAT. 470 (1875).
3. Rogers v. Frito-lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1980). Judge Alvin B.
Rubin wrote for a majority declining "to do judicially what Congress has not done legislatively," Id. at 1085, in terms of creating private causes of action for violations of the REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973 § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1982).

lent as to private rights of actions or expressly provided statutory
remedies that differ from those sought by the plaintiff.
How sad it is that Cort v. Ash 4 and Cannon v. University of
Chicago,5 to which Judge Rubin looked for guidance in a dubious
task, cannot easily be characterized as calling anew for judicial activism. Rather, they are milestones in a slow ascent from the constitutional nadir of the Supreme Court's majority opinion in J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak.0 In Borak, Justice Clark proclaimed the "duty of the
courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to"
more fully effect purposes of remedial federal legislation7 Borak inferred not only a remedy but a cause of action. A clear majority of
current Supreme Court Justices apparently recognizes that the federal judiciary has no duty to provide a cause of action that judges of
a moment may think Congress overlooked. 8 While this recognition
may give solace to those worried about judicial arrogations of power,
such comfort must be limited. It is far from clear that a majority of
the sitting Justices recognizes that federal courts have neither the
duty nor the legitimate power to act as a specialized legislature dedicated to serving both identified and presumed congressional
purposes.
How sad it is that a majority of the Supreme Court has not
admitted that an attack on the constitutionally vital separation of
powers doctrine is implicit in the implementation of judicially inferred legislative intent to provide private rights of action.9 Although
judicially inferred causes of action evolved from the simple espousal
of an affirmative duty to honor theories urged in aid of otherwise
4. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
5. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
6. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
7. Id. at 433 (emphasis supplied). While Justice Clark spoke of "remedies," he did so
in the process of remarking Congress' supposed implication of a private cause of action to
acquit the purposes of section 14(a) of the SECURITIEs EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78n(a) (1982). See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text. Section 14(a) is inoperative
unless supplemented by regulations concerning proxy solicitation promulgated by the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (S.E.C.). Thus, Justice Clark's thoughts concerned acquittal of
the policy explicit in S.E.C. Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1979). How Congress so
anticipates the content of regulations through the years, as to imply a private right of action
for their breach, is not a question peculiar to the "proxy rules." See, e.g., S.E.C. Rule 1Ob-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979), in a historical context starting with Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) and ranging through Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) via the celebrated footnote 9 in Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) and the reform in substance accomplished by Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
8. See, e.g., TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as TAMA]; Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
9. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Consider this counsel of one who advocated adoption of our present constitution: "Were the
power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and the liberty of the subject would be
exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator." The Federalist No. 46
(J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).

silent federal statutes, the Court has done little substantively to undo
the basic errors. Rather, its recent teachings tend to complicate the
task of lower federal courts because they must construct extensive
rationalizations of ultimately permissive inferences as to surely obscure congressional purposes. When satisfied that Congress may
have intended a private cause of action, a court must then extrapolate the elements of proof. One may easily conclude that much of the
Supreme Court's recent guidance is nothing more than a disciplinary
demand that lower courts' permissive inferences be more probable
than those achieved through the virtually untrammeled induction invited between 1964 and 1975.10 Yet, superficially more rigorous
techniques cannot avoid the proposition that, if federal courts usurp
congressional prerogatives, the usurpation is not cured by charitable
recognition of courts' benign purpose."
How sad it is that, when pursuing a reformed mode of divining
a federal question supposedly implied by a statute, the Supreme
Court explicitly relies on precedent concerning federal courts' evolu-3
1
tion of common law 12 during the period between Swift v. Tyson
and Erie Railroad v. Tompkins."' The Court's primary reliance15 in
this analysis is on Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby, 6 a 1916 decision jurisdictionally possible only on a thesis 17 later repudiated by
Congress and the Court. 18 Although a federal statute was implicated
in Rigsby, 19 the holding purported to be no more than an evolution
and an application of general common law principles by a Court
then deemed able to do both.
How sad it is that a majority of the Supreme Court cannot acknowledge or recognize that the common law courts' generation of
substantive rules of decision proceeds from an undoubted jurisdictional base but the federal courts' inference that a federal statute
implies such a rule proceeds to the "federal question" jurisdiction.
10. Thus, in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 77-78 (1975) and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374-77 (1982), the majority opinions placed great
weight on Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), in which were invoked various
aids here evoked to statutory construction appropriate to common law courts' generation of
tort per se theories. See infra notes 16-19, 21-48 and accompanying text.
I1. Per a legally sophisticated bard, Portia long ago resisted her husband's plea "to do
a great right, do a little wrong" by prompting that "many an error by the same example will
rush into state."
12. Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
13. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
14. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
15. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78; Curran, 456 U.S. at 374-77.
16. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
17. Pacific Railroad Removal Cases of 1885, 115 U.S. 1 (1885).
18. Section I of the Judicial Code and Judiciary Amendments of 1948, 28 U.S.C. §
1349 (1948); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 n.50
(1959).
19. 27 STAT. 531 (1893), as amended by 32 STAT. 943 (1903) and 36 STAT. 298
(1910).

How sad it is that holdings concerning statutory implication of
private rights of action are so unpredictable as to generate significant
appellate case loads. This is particularly lamentable if it is true that
much of the problem springs from the forty-year-long 20 inability or
unwillingness of a majority of the Court to cope with the consequences of effectively ignoring the obvious: U.S. District Courts lack
the generalized original jurisdiction enjoyed by their usual state
counterparts. Surely, forty years is not an overwhelming era in the
history of a judiciary nearing its two-hundredth anniversary. This is
particularly true of a judiciary blessed with Justice Brandeis' teaching in Erie that
If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we
should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied
throughout nearly a century . . .Thus the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson is, as Mr. Justice Holmes said, "an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United States which no
lapse of time or respectable
array of opinion should make us
21
hesitate to correct.
Over forty-five years have passed since the Erie decision was
handed down. Before that, Swift stood for ninety-six years.
How sad it is that, unable to emulate Justice Brandeis' recognition of the principle that a long-pursued judicial course of conduct
will not amend the Constitution, 2 the Supreme Court not only allows federal courts to flounder in the quicksand of permissive inference as to legislative purposes to create substantive private rights,
but does so in a context in which recognition of an implied cause of
action provides the "federal question" upon which the courts' jurisdiction necessarily rests. Thus, the federal judiciary must accommodate the spectre of a permissive inference that creates both an individual right and an expansion of otherwise constitutionally limited
jurisdiction. The process is called "boot-strapping." When Congress
clearly delineates federal courts' jurisdiction in the only constitutionally permissible manner, may courts of calculatedly limited jurisdiction enlarge that power by indulging ultimately self-aggrandizing
permissive inferences as to unstated congressional purposes? The Su20. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 215 (1976), in which the
Supreme Court held that the cause of action implied by S.E.C. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240
l0b-5 (1984), includes scienter as an element of proof indispensable to the inferred substantive
rule of decision. See generally Maher & Blasi, Lessons from Ernst & Ernst, 82 DICK. L. REV.
1 (1977). See also Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
21. Erie Ry. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77 (1938). There is no pretense herein that
Erie governs the question of causes of action implied by federal statute. Erie was a diversity
case, whereas the implied cause of action invokes the "federal question" jurisdiction.
22. Note that Erie's announcement also occasioned release of Hinderlider v. LaPlata
River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938), in which the role of "federal
common law" in peculiarly federal questions was confirmed by Justice Brandeis.

preme Court equivocates, retreating into varying semantics concerning the relative weights assigned to individually inconclusive indicia
concerning possible congressional purpose. Not only has the Court
failed to respond to this question but, far worse from a constitutional
viewpoint, it has invited inferior federal courts to evolve their own
jurisdiction. Still worse, when lower courts correctly or incorrectly
infer jurisdiction and a substantive rule of decision, they deem subsequent amendment of the pertinent statutory scheme to be an effective ratification and perpetuation of such holdings, unless Congress
23
erects a disclaimer.
How sad it is to study the 1982 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Curran decision 24 and conclude that much of the

ascent since the Borak nadir is lost or at risk. If Curran provides
longstanding guidance, one must conclude that the change marked

by Cort and Cannon is more formal than substantive, more disciplinary than essential, more productive of footwork than salutary, and
quite dispensable in the presence of at least one sort of inference.2 5
23. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for Justice Brandeis' words. Consider a
district court's perception of its role when dealing with a motion to dismiss a complaint
founded on a supposedly implied cause of action:
The analysis which we must undertake in determining whether Congress intended that a private right of action be implied is clear. (citations omitted). We
must, of course, begin with the language of the statute itself, asking what the
language reveals about the purpose of the statute. Secondly, we must examine
the legislative history which . . . now includes the state of the law at the time
the legislation was enacted. And finally, we must examine the statutory scheme
for indications of congressional intent, is established, there is no need to examine
each of the four [Cori factors].
Basile v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 551 F. Supp. 580, 584 (S.D. Ohio 1982)
(emphasis supplied).
Use of the word "now" indicated prompt submission to Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982),
handed down earlier in 1982. In the Curran majority opinion, the "state of the law" at the
time of substantial amendments to a remedial regulatory scheme included a dozen decisions by
inferior courts acknowledging that various portions of the scheme implied a private right of
action. Curran, 456 U.S. at 379-82. The Curran majority opinion scrupulously avoided particularized examination of the lower court decisions and whether any of them was within the
jurisdiction of the court rendering it. See infra notes 25-52 and accompanying text. Thus, to
the degree that any one or more of them was extrajurisdictional, the Court effectively burdens
Congress to disclaim the consequence, lest later legislative attention to the scheme is taken to
affirm propriety of judicial arrogation.
24. 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
25. To wit: availability to private suitors of causes of action and remedies correctly or
incorrectly inferred by United States courts from parts of federal regulatory schemes is confirmed by Congress' later amendment of the scheme in significant particulars so long as Congress neither disclaims the inferences nor alters the statutory segments concerning which the
inferences were operative.
This beguiling thesis, having rhetorical warrant but only partial validation in judicial presumptions that subsequent legislative silence as to courts' prior resolutions of ambiguities in
statutory language constitutes legislative endorsement of such resolutions, ignores the reality
that judicial resolution of statutory ambiguities presupposes jurisdiction in the resolving courts.
If such courts were not seized of jurisdiction, there is no ground upon which later to hold that
Congress must be presumed to acknowledge the judges' formulations and to discriminate
among them.
Can less be said of situations in which federal courts, rather than confronting ambiguities
in statutory language, deal with legislative silence? If federal courts improperly infer jurisdic-

How sad it is to see the Court, by continued mishandling of the
nonpartisan "implied cause of action" thesis, come to provide an issue for those who are joining to curtail the powers of the federal
judiciary.2" Where is the constitutional mandate for the Court to
protect availability of rights of action permissively inferred, as opposed to mandatorily inferred, from statutes which either are silent
as to private rights or provide relief other than that which would
content a given plaintiff?
How easy it could be for the Supreme Court, without prejudice
to its constitutional duty, to continue assuring a federal forum for
those possessed of rights of action implied by the Constitution27
while limiting recognition of statutorily "implied causes of action" to
those concerning which inference is inescapable.2 8 In doing so, the
Court would restore traditional canons of statutory construction to
their former dignity. It is ironic to honor the canons of construction
tion from a federal statute as a prelude to generating a substantive rule of decision and affording remedies concerning which Congress has not spoken, the courts' acts are ultra vires. It is
impermissible to say that later amendments, silent as to either the ultra vires acts or those
portions of the statute improperly said to afford jurisdiction, in and of themselves not only
constitute legislative ratification of the ultra vires acts but also prospectively obligate other
courts to equate ultra vires expressions with precedent afforded by courts acting intra vires. To
say that intervening amendments require later courts to honor earlier ones' arrogations, when
Congress itself neither was obligated to rise to the bait nor did so, is not only to abuse a useful
guide to statutory construction in the presence of ambiguity but inevitably to produce mischief.
Permissive inference of a cause of action and power to remedy it from legislative silence
vice ambiguity is a process dramatically different from obeying a mandate to afford particularized relief implicit in an express provision of a right or substantive rule of decision by the
Constitution or Congress. As Justice Frankfurter taught:
no one will gainsay that the function in construing a statute is to ascertain the
meaning of words used by the legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power
which our democracy has lodged in its elected legislature. The great judges have
constantly admonished their brethren of the need for discipline in observing the
limitations. A judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge it, nor to contract it. An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated,
cannot be judicially supplied however much later wisdom may recommend the
inclusion.
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM L. REV. 527, 529-30
(1947). Frankfurter taught in the context of expressions by the great Justices Cardozo and
Brandeis. Cardozo warned against pausing "to consider whether a statute differently conceived
and framed would yield results more consonant with fairness and reason." Anderson v. Wilson,
289 U.S. 20, 27 (1933). Brandeis would not accommodate a party who "asks ... not a construction of a statute but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the court so that what was omitted,
presumably by inadvertance, may be included within its scope." Iselin v. United States, 270
U.S. 245, 250-51 (1926).
26. See, e.g., S. 3018, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. by which Senator East would have reformed "the federal judiciary and promote[d] the separation of powers." Part G of the bill
provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, no Act of Congress shall be construed to grant to any party any cause of action at law or in equity unless that Act expressly
grants such a cause of action." Id. See also R. Wilkey, Activism by the Branch of Last Resort: Of the Seizure of Abandoned Swords and Purses, in National Legal Center for the
Public Interest (1984).
27. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228
(1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
28. See, e.g., TAMA, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).

to resolve statutory ambiguity but to rely on far less when confronted with silence. In principle, legislative history does not demonstrate statutory ambiguity, although such materials are useful to resolve facial ambiguity. How is it less offensive to a government of
laws rather than one of volatile humans to use these materials to fill
an unambiguous void?
The authors foresee no early reform by the Supreme Court.
Rather, they predict that Curran will occasion the expenditure of a
disproportionate amount of judicial time on rationalizing the irrational. Therefore, the authors regretfully propose a statutory solution
in an appendix to this article. Essentially, the authors would deny
federal courts the power to infer legal causes of action from federal
statutes and endow such courts with power to grant equitable relief
in limited circumstances. Subject to traditional tests such as those
pertinent to standing, private petitioners who allege and prove actual
or clearly incipient violations of explicit federal statutory rules of
conduct may be afforded equitable relief, although Congress' express
commital of enforcement power runs only to an agency or prosecutors. Plaintiff's burden of proving injury or its likelihood would vary
by reference to the nature of relief sought." The authors calculatedly refrain from proposing that an explicit grant of equitable jurisdiction include power to redress or restrain conduct allegedly violative of rules promulgated by agencies. The authors accept the utility
of encouraging private attorneys-general; and would explicitly provide for successful suitors' recovery of expenses, including attorneys'
fees.
Are such measures necessary? Curran makes the necessity
clear. Although the case is discussed at length in this article, the
authors recommend independent study of the majority and dissenting opinions."0 To appreciate them, a historical background is
appropriate.
II.

Background for Merrill Lynch

A.

The Rigsby Reed

The propriety of inferring private causes of action from federal
statutes is the source of so much comment that comprehensive citation is unnecessary."1 Since at least 1943, the Supreme Court and
29. See, e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co., 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
30. 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
31. See, e.g., Maher, Implied Rights of Action and the Federal Securities Laws, 37
WASH & LEE L. REV. 783 (1980). See also, e.g., Crawford & Schneider, The Implied Cause
of Action and the Federal Aviation Act, 23 VILL. L. REV. 657 (1978); Steinberg, Implied
Private Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 33 (1979); McMahon &
Rodos, JudicialImplication of Private Causes of Action, 80 DICK. L. REV. 167 (1976); Note,
Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 453 (1963);

lower federal courts have cited32 Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby33 as authority for the permissive inference of such rights. 34 Unfortunately, the 1916 Rigsby decision did not enunciate the principle
for which it is said to stand. Regrettably, the majority opinion in
Rigsby used the word "implied" 35 from which far too much has been
inferred.
Plaintiff Rigsby, a railway worker, based a personal injury action on defendant's violation of a federal statute aimed at worker
safety. Violation of the statute explicitly entailed only penal consequences. The statute provided inter alia that employees not be
deemed to have assumed the risks occasioned by an employer's
breach of statutory duty.36 Plaintiff sued in a state court from which
removal was effected by virtue of defendant's status as a federally
incorporated enterprise. Removal was predicated on the now discred37
ited Pacific Railroad Removal Cases of 1885.
Ultimately, relying on an 1854 Queens Bench decision in the
matter of Couch v. Steel,3 8 the Supreme Court held that the right to
recover "damages from the party in default is implied, according to
a doctrine of the common law." 39 The statutory proscription against
assumption of risk, which made little sense in a purely penal context,
was vital to the inference. While Rigsby presented a federal question
because of defendant's incorporation, Swift v. Tyson4 was still on
the books. Thus, there was no great pressure to restrict federal
courts' generation of substantive rules of decision by reference to the
particular nonadmiralty jurisdiction being exercised. As late as 1934,
the Supreme Court described the Rigsby holding as one which
"sprang from the principle of the common law. 4 1
Because of its role in shaping American law, Couch v. Steel
deserves exposition. Unlike our federal courts, Queens Bench was a
common-law court. The Couch decision flows from Anglo-American
Note, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933: Implications of a Private Right of Action,
29 UCLA L. REV. 244 (1981); Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Title IX, 13 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 425 (1978); Comment, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran: Establishing an Implied Right of Action Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 10
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 815 (1983).
. 32. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374
(1982); Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 387 n.26 (5th Cit. 1982); Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
33. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
34. Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 240-46 (2d Cir. 1944) (Clark, J., dissenting).
35. 241 U.S. at 39.
36. Id. at 39-40, 43.
37. 115 U.S. 1 (1885).
38. 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (1854).
39. 241 U.S. at 39.
40. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
41. Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio & Co. Ry. 291 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1934).
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paternalism toward seamen. 2 The British penal statute in question
required shipowners to stock medicines for the benefit of the ship's
company personnel on board vessels engaged in international trading. The common-law court held that, when a remedial statute is
inadequate for the legislative purpose of protecting a class of which
plaintiff is a member, a private cause of action is available at common law.4 3 This comports with Blackstone"' and the much later Restatement (Second) of Torts."5
Federal courts, however, are not common-law courts. Presupposing the acquisition of personal jurisdiction and the absence of a statute explicitly providing a substantive rule of decision in private lawsuits, common-law courts of general jurisdiction derive the existence
or nonexistence of a substantive rule of decision by reference to authoritative expressions of public policy, including judicial precedent.
Public policy is heavily implicated when a plaintiff's tort per se theory rests on the violation of a statute that is silent as to private rights
to relief. Hence, in evaluating a tort per se theory, common-law
courts must determine whether the statute protects the class of
which plaintiff is a member. This evaluation occurs when the court is
seized of jurisdiction and the plaintiff urges only a favorable substantive rule of decision.
When federal courts exercise diversity jurisdiction, Erie guides
them in selecting municipal as opposed to federal substantive rules of
decision. When federal courts exercise federal question jurisdiction,
the Constitution, treaties and statutes of the United States provide
substantive rules. Private parties who invoke federal question jurisdiction may rely only on those substantive rules of decision that are
found in or necessarily implied by the Constitution, treaties or federal statutes unless Congress compels or authorizes federal courts to
make "federal common law."4' 6 Parties who rely on causes of action
or seek remedies implied by federal statute are not relying on federal
common law. Rather, they assert that a given rule of conduct defined
by Congress or an agency implies congressional provision of a particularized federal right of action for that rule's violation. The statute
42. See generally GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 272-314 (2d ed.
1975).
43. 118 Eng. Rep. at 1197. As late as 1960, it was suggested that the Couch methodology is acceptable in England only in employee welfare contexts. See Williams, The Effect of
Penal Legislation in the Law of Tort, 23 MoD. L. REV. 233, 244 (1960).
44. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 23 (15th ed. 1807) (Whenever a legal
right is invaded, there is a legal remedy).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
46. See, e.g., Wajundotte Trans. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 203-06 (1967);
Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 34 (1956); United States
v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211, 213 (1955); Hinderlider v. LaPlata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,
304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938); American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 292
F.2d 640, 643-44 (9th Cir. 1961).

or agency rule is urged as the substantive rule of decision to resolve
private controversies and federal question jurisdiction; it is a consequence of, rather than a predicate for, the substantive rule of
decision.
When private parties urge the recognition of a cause of action
or mode of relief as implied by a federal statute, they necessarily
wish to avail themselves of federal question jurisdiction. Motivations
vary. Nationwide service, liberal discovery, relaxed rules of evidence,
or something so simple as relative calendar loadings may dictate
preference for a federal court, although diversity jurisdiction is unavailable. Discontent with otherwise relevant state rules may be at
play. Thus, state substantive rules of decision may have evolved differently from the thrust of federal regulation. State statutes may
preclude generation of tort per se theories,4 7 or state burden of proof
assignments may be onerous. When federal regulatory schemes
speak in particulars beyond those enunciated by state legislatures or
likely to be the subject of state courts' extended tort per se analyses,
they encourage plaintiffs to invoke the federal courts' assistance to
flesh out theories inferred from federal statutes.
B.

Extrapolation Upon Extrapolation

Despite citation to Rigsby, the real onslaught of implied federal
causes of action dates from the nineteen-forties. In 1941, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held, in
Geismar v. Bond & Goodman, Inc.,48 that sections 15(c)(1) 49 and
2950 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) 51 provided a
right to damages cognizable in a federal court. Section 15(c)(1) prohibited securities brokers' use of "manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent" devices to induce the purchase or sale of securities.
Definition of such devices is delegated to the Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.). 52 Section 29 characterizes as void all
contracts made in violation of the '34 Act, or rules promulgated
under it. 53 Although the '34 Act expressly provides penal54 and administrative 55 sanctions as well as certain causes of action for private
suitors, 5 neither section 15(c), nor section 29, is a vehicle for ex47. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Securities Act of 1972 § 506, PA. STAT ANN. tit. 70, §§ I506 (1984).
48. 40 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2) (1982).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(2) 78cc(b) (1982).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(I) (1982).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1982).
55. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1982).
56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p(b), 78i(e) (1982).

press private rights of action. United States District Courts have exclusive jurisdiction of alleged violations of the '34 Act, and the rules
implementing it. 5 7 While the inference of a right to rescission seems
compelled by statutory characterization of an agreement's voidness, 58 the Geismar court failed to substantiate its authority to hold
that damages were also available. The court extrapolated jurisdiction
to award damages from the inference that rescission was available.
Within a few years, the Second Circuit contributed Baird v.
Franklin.5 9 Its contribution was curious. A district court dismissed a
suit invoking a cause of action said to be implied by section 6(b)60 of
the '34 Act. The court predicated its affirmance of the dismissal on
plaintiff's inability to prove damages."1 Section 6(b) obligates national securities exchanges to enforce their own rules."' Purporting to
dissent from the majority's affirmance of the district court, Judge
Clark gratuitously discussed implication, a nonissue. He held forth
on the liberality with which courts should consider theories that federal securities laws imply private causes of action. Although he cited
Rigsby as an operational precedent, his main thesis was that failure
to infer causes of action would generate popular resentment.6 3 Court
often cite this dissent and misconstrue it almost as often. 6 4 Judge
Clark's dissent was but the prelude to his majority opinion in Gold65
stein v. Groesbeck.
In Goldstein, plaintiff-shareholder in a utilities holding company
brought a derivative action for an accounting of profits mischanneled
in violation of section 4(a)(2) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act.6 6 While section 4(a)(2) proscribed certain conduct,
neither this section nor any other section of the Act expressly created
a private cause of action for the violation of section 4. Section 26(b)
of the Act voids offensive contracts6 7 in the same manner as does
section 29 of the '34 Act.6" Citing Geismar and enlarging on public
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982).
58. See TAMA, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (construing § 215 of Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1982)).
59. 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1982).
61. 141 F.2d at 239 (2d Cir. 1944).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1982).
63. 141 F.2d at 245 (Clark, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that Judge Clark
cited Rigsby, see supra notes 32-47 and accompanying text for the thesis that statutory failure
to provide "machinery or procedure" to acquit individual right is immaterial to judicial ability
to fashion a remedy.
64. See, for example, Judge Friendly's reference to "Judge Clark's much cited opinion
in Baird v. Franklin" without disclosure that the "opinion" was a dissent. Leist v. Simplot, 638
F.2d 283, 298 (2d Cir. 1980).
65. 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 79d(a)(2) (1982).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 79z(b) (1982).
68. See supra note 53. Both the '34 Act and the Public Utility Holding Company Act
provided penal sanctions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff, 78z-3 (1982).

expectations of vigorous securities law enforcement,6 9 Judge Clark
had no difficulty recognizing the implied availability of equitable accounting. Thus, Geismar extrapolated jurisdiction to award damages
from an inference as to suitability of rescission and Goldstein extrapolated jurisdiction to afford accounting from Geismar. How much
simpler it would have been, in Goldstein and for posterity, to proceed on the basis that accounting was available in aid of rescission.
The much heralded Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.7" of 1946
is the next important landmark on the road to easy inference of jurisdiction. This district court decision concerning an equitable accounting was the first of many decision celebrating S.E.C. Rule lOb5 1' as beneficient for those aggrieved in connection with securities
trading. Section 10(b) of the '34 Act, as implemented by Rule lOb5, strikes at use of manipulative and deceptive devices defined by the
S.E.C.72 Although it cited Rigsby, the Kardon court went much further in holding that "mere omission of an express provision for civil
73
liability is not sufficient to negative what the general law implies.
Other than the Restatement of Torts, the all-pervading legal system
the court had in mind remains obscure. It was, however, so omnipresent that defendant bore the burden of demonstrating legislative
intent to deny a cause of action or remedy. The court did not rely on
Rule lOb-5 alone. It also cited section 29 of the '34 Act. 4 In context
of the petitioner's objectives in equity, this provision might have
served very nicely as the principal basis for principled decision. However, the decision is fairly cited for holding that Rule lOb-5 implies a
private right of action. Unfortunately, probably due to the court's
explicit endorsement of Geismar,75 Kardon is frequently but improperly cited for the proposition that Rule lOb-5 implies a legal cause of
action.
Geismar, Goldstein and Kardon presaged Supreme Court holdings that sections of the Motor Carriers Act, 76 Investment Advisers
69. 142 F.2d at 427. In 1944 the Supreme Court also recognized that the Railway
Labor Act implied a cause of action for a railway employee whose collective bargaining representatives indulged racial discrimination. Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323
U.S. 210 (1944). It is arguable, however, that Tunstall represents a stage in the post-Erie
evolution of "federal common law" committed by Congress to the courts. See, e.g., Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 90-91 (1981); Textile Workers Union of
Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
70. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
71. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
73. 69 F. Supp. at 514. What was included in the "general law?" The court appealed
inter alia to section 286 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Id. at 513, which, of
course, recognizes or suggests substantive rules of decision but cannot supply jurisdiction.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982).
75. 69 F. Supp. at 514.
76. Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freightways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962) (misrouting).
Only a few years before, the Court had refused to infer a private right of action from the

Act,7 7 civil rights acts,7 8 and the "Wreck Statute ' 79 implied private
rights of action. Circuit courts of appeals acknowledged or subsumed
implied private causes of action by reference to sections of the Commodity Exchange Act,8" Securities Act of 1933,81 Rehabilitation Act
of 1979,82 Davis-Bacon Act,8 3 Social Security Act, 84 Hill-Burton
Act,8 5 Federal Communications Act,8 Civil Aeronautics Act87 and
Consumer Credit Protection Act.8 8 District courts recognized or assumed that private rights are implied by sections of the Federal
Trade Commission Act8 9 and Federal Aviation Act."0 This catalogue
calculatedly omits holdings that constitutional provisions can imply

private rights of action. 91
Impetus for this development came in 1964 when the Supreme
Court decided J.I. Case v. Borak.9 2 In Borak, the plaintiff sought
redress for violation of proxy solicitation rules pertinent to securing
Motor Carrier Act's condemnation of unjust and unreasonable charges. T.I.M.E., Inc. v.
United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959). However, T.I.M.E. was decided in context of a regulatory
commission's possession of primary jurisdiction over carriers. While T.I.M.E. held that neither
statutory language nor legislative history supported inference of a private right of action, the
Hewitt-Robins majority considered legislative purpose and concluded that, since denial of relief would leave shippers relatively helpless against erring carriers, it must be presumed that
Congress did not intend such a result. 371 U.S. at 89. This holding paved the way for Borak,
see infra text accompanying notes 92-104. In terms of later considering Merrill Lynch, see
infra notes 209-258 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court denigrated a theory that congressional silence as to rights of action said to predate recasting the relevant statute constitutes
adoption of such theories. Rather, the T.I.M.E. Court said that only "the clearest indication
that Congress intended [a statute] to preserve" such theories would justify inference as to their
continued existence. 359 U.S. at 475.
77. TAMA, 444 U.S. II (1979).
78. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (Civil Rights Act of 1870); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections,
393 U.S. 544 (1969) (Voting Rights Act of 1965); Jones v. A.H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968) (Civil Rights Act of 1866). See also infra notes 118-133 and accompanying text.
79. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 200 (1967) (Rivers &
Harbors Act of 1899).
80. McCurnin v. Kohlmayer & Co., 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973); Deaktor v. Schreiber & Co., 479 F.2d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Chicago
Mercantile Exchange v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973) (per curiam).
81. Fischmann v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 n.2 (2d Cir. 1951) (dictum);
but see Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982); Globus v. Law
Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1283 (2d Cir. 1969).
82. NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979) (§ 504 of Rehabilitation Act and § 601 of Civil Rights Act of 1964); but see Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d
1074 (5th Cir. 1980).
83. McDaniel v. University of Chicago, 528 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1977); but see Universities Research Ass'n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981); United States v. Capeletti Bros.,
Inc., 621 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1980).
84. Like v. Carter, 448 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1045 (1972).
85. Eurestic v,Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972).
86. Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947).
87. Fitzgerald v. Pan American Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956).
88. Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974).
89. Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
90. Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
91. See supra note 27.
92. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).

shareholder approval of a merger. More particularly, he alleged that
proxy solicitation materials were false and misleading in violation of
S.E.C. Rule 14a-9 under the '34 Act.9" Section 14(a) of the Act
prohibits proxy solicitations by companies required to be registered
under the Act that contravene rules promulgated by the S.E.C. 9
Unlike section 10(b) of the Act,95 section 14(a) makes no reference
to manipulation, deception or other tools of classic or constructive
fraud. Rule 14(a)(9) merely strikes at misrepresentations by commission or omission. 96
Sections 10(b) and 14(a) are empty baskets until filled by
S.E.C. rulemaking. Only section 10(b) makes explicit reference to
antisocial practices.97 Thus, the inference that section 14(a) implies
a private cause of action arises separately from the basis provided by
section 10(b).
The Supreme Court held that section 27 of the '34 Act's conferral of exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts, including "all suits in
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty
created by the Act or regulations promulgated thereunder,"9' 8 itself
implied availability of relief to private suitors alleging violations of
the S.E.C.'s Rule 14a-9.9 9 The '34 Act expressly provides for private
rights of action in particularized cases010 as well as availability of
equitable relief at the instance of the S.E.C. 11 One need not remark
the implications of jumping from a jurisdictional warrant accommodating these express provisions to a thesis that the warrant permits
inferences from sections hinting at particularized species of antisocial conduct (in such a manner as to provide reasonable standards
for agency rulemaking) or, even more improbably, sections entirely
devoid of such hints.
The Borak holding relies squarely on section 27 of the '34 Act.
Thus, if the holding states a rule for construction of the '34 Act, all
of its sections that are for the benefit of explicitly or otherwise obviously intended classes imply private causes of action for members of
such classes! Happily, and probably not fortuitously, this is an unusual interpretation of Borak.'02 The Court gratuitously provided a
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1984).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
96. See supra note 93.
97. The partial text of § 10(b) is as follows: "To use or employ . . . any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules . . . as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
98. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982).
99. 377 U.S. at 428.
100. Sections 9, 16(b), 18(a) and 20(a) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78p(b), 78c(a)
and 78b(a) (1982), expressly provide for liability in favor of private suitors.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982).
102. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979) (dictum).

rationale for inferring a cause of action from section 14(a). Congressional standards of delegation for the S.E.C.'s implementation of
thesection, that is, "rules . . . necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of inventors," were taken to evidence
the statute's broad remedial purposes.1"3 Recognizing that the S.E.C.
writes and administers proxy solicitation rules, which entail solicitors' clearance of materials with the Commission, the Court nevertheless grandly ignored obvious S.E.C. control over the relevant time
frames when generating a private attorney-general thesis.
Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission action. . . . Time does not permit an
independent examination of the . . . proxy material and this results in the Commission's acceptance of the representations ...
We, therefore, believe that under the circumstances here it
is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as
are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose. 0 4
The "circumstances" to which the Court alluded embrace the
S.E.C.'s definition of temporal periods in which to accomplish review
and Congress' exclusive power to appropriate funds suitable to doing
the job it wishes done. In any event, it was the Court rather than
Congress that characterized private enforcement as necessary, and
the Court as opposed to Congress that promulgated a judicial oversight duty.
C. Retreat From Random Extrapolation?
Like Couch and Rigsby, Cort v. Ash addressed an essentially
penal statute.1" 5 However, the plaintiffs in Cort were derivative suitors. The causa belli was expenditure of enterprise funds in alleged
violation of a statute proscribing corporate political contributions at
the federal level. A unanimous Supreme Court held against implication of a remedy by a statute aimed at social objectives other than
corporate welfare or shareholder protection. Writing for the Court,
Justice Brennan took the opportunity to delineate the "Cort factors"
which now occupy so much space in reports of federal decisions.
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a
statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant.
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted," Texas & Pacific Railroad v. Rigsby,
. . . that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of
the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent,
103.
104.
105.

377 U.S. at 431-32.
Id. at 432-33.
Act of June 28, 1948, ch 645 § 1, 62

STAT

723, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (repealed 1976).

explicit or implied, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one? .. .Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of
the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?
.. .And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally rele-

gated to state law, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
cause of action based solely on state law? 1"6
Note, particularly in light of later decisions, the uses of "remedy,"
"right of action" and "cause of action" in this quotation from Cort.
Since the fourth factor or inquiry demonstrates that the Court
knew the difference between inference and implication, one could
suggest that the use of "imply" in the third factor is equivalent to a
freudian slip, as it hints at the Court's willingness unilaterally to
provide a remedy in specified circumstances. Happily, later decisions
minimize the impetus to make such a suggestion as it has become
clearer that the third and fourth Cort inquiries are subsidiary considerations. Evaluation of the first two factors, however, demands
recognition of a thesis not unlike that developed in Kardon.10 7 "[In
situations in which it is clear that federal law has granted a class of
persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intent to create
a private action, although an explicit purpose to deny such cause of
action would be controlling." 108 The Court offered these words to
enhance understanding of the second factor. Together with the language used in the second factor, it suggests that the burden of persuasion as to Congress' intent varies by reference to the statute itself.
Thus, if a statute ordains a protected class with some particularity,
availability of "a remedy" is presumed absent a strong negation.
However, if the statute is vague about a class to be protected, the
burden is upon those who would achieve a remedy to persuade
through use of legislative history. This interpretation has an unfortunate effect because it encourages advocates to demonstrate that statutes are ambiguous so that the clarifications appropriate to the demonstrator's purpose then can be developed.
The first factor serves two roles additional to memorializing
Rigsby. On the one hand, it triggers the pro-remedy presumption
mechanism within the second factor. On the other hand, it is a
standing requirement.
The third factor is better stated as a sub-part of the "intent"
inquiry. A negative answer to the third inquiry tends to shift the
balance against plaintiff absent an affirmative response to the first
inquiry. Clearly, the Court contemplated that an affirmative response to the first inquiry would be well-nigh controlling as to legis106.
107.
108.

Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
422 U.S. at 82 (emphasis supplied).

lative intent. Thus, the effect of Cort is far more permissive than
that of Rigsby! 10 9
Taken in isolation, the fourth factor's approach to characterizing causes of action as "traditionally relegated to state law" is puzzling. Surely a federal court's perception that Congress failed to legislate comprehensively cannot warrant judicial creation of a cause of
action. Similarly, congressional redundancy does not warrant judicial
relegation if Congress intends a cause of action. If permissive inferences as to federal courts' jurisdiction are appropriate, however, response to the fourth inquiry may serve to reinforce an affirmative
response to the third inquiry. Borak was cited in amplification of the
consistency with "underlying purpose of the legislation scheme" and
"relegation" themes. More specifically, the Borak "duty" of alertness "to provide" remedies was evoked in discussion of the third factor while the fourth factor was butressed with a Borak fear that congressional purposes would be frustrated if plaintiffs must rely on
state courts. 1 '
All in all, the formulation was unfortunate. It tended not only to
equate intent with discrete qualities of indicia concerning intent, but
also to suggest appropriateness of recourse to legislative history when
remedial statutes, rather than being cursed with ambiguity, are not
as complete as some would have them. Surely, the essential test must
be Congress' intent, as made manifest on the face of a statute or,
when ambiguity is present, as susceptible of easy development from
authoritative secondary sources. While obvious concern for a particularized class is an affirmative index to such intent, Congress' failure
to legislate sufficiently to suit judges' preferences would seem quite
irrelevant. However, this paragraph discloses the authors' biases
rather than the state of the law.
A checkered history has succeeded the unanimity of Cort. This
history suggests a significant communications failure among the Justices as a prelude to the strangely unanimous opinion in Cort.
Justices Brennan and Stevens, joined only in spirit by Justice
Blackmun, dissented from a careful obeisance to Cort in Piper v.
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.1 ' While it respected all of Cort's "remedy" usages, the majority denied that section 14(e) of the '34 Act
provides' 1 2 an unsuccessful tender offeror with a cause of action
against a successful competitor for the target company.
109. In Rigsby, the Court inferred a right of action from not only statutory particularization of a class of beneficiaries but also statutory language simultaneously superfluous to a
penal statute and pertinent to allocating burdens of proof in a personal injury act. 241 U.S. at
39-40, 43.
110. 422 U.S. at 84, 85.
II.
430 U.S. I, 51, 53-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).

Shortly thereafter, the Court refused to expand the cause of action that was by then historically implied by S.E.C. Rule 10b-5113 to

include relief for shareholders who were squeezedout in an allegedly
unfair shortform merger that was devoid of manipulative conduct in
any classic sense.11 Citing both Cort and Piper, Justice White's
opinion in Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green..5 discounted the applicability of Rule lOb-5 to merely harsh usages. He noted that existence of a state-provided remedy made it entirely appropriate to relegate plaintiffs to state remedies.1" 6 While Justice Brennan
dissented,' 17 Justices Blackmun and Stevens contented themselves
with abstaining from the essentially surplus Cort analysis since, on
the face of the matter, there was no fraud of the classic variety.1 18
Cannon v. University of Chicago'l" addressed whether a person
denied admission to medical school by reason of her sex enjoyed a
right of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972.120 The ultimate Cannon disposition adds much to the rhetoric

incident to implication of private rights of action. However, due to a
multiplicity of separate expressions reminiscent of Regents of the
University of Californiav. Bakke,12 1 the majority and other opinions

must be handled with care. Justice Stevens wrote for a majority
which held for the plaintiff. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the majority opinion but wrote a separate concurrence joined by Justice
Stewart. The Chief Justice concurred only in the result. Justices
Powell and White wrote extended dissents. Justice Blackmun joined

in the latter.
Title IX was held to present the atypical situation in which all
of the Cort factors favored concluding that Congress implied a right
of action.122 Consequently, Justice Stevens declined to comparatively
113. Superintendent of Ins. of the State of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404
U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
114. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Court held that scienter
is an element of proof in a private damage action proceeding under Rule lOb-5. Id. at 215.
Thus, in a sense, Rule lOb-5 actions at law were equated with common law fraud. See, e.g.,
Glanzer v. Shephard, 233 N.Y. 235, 136 N.E. 275 (1922); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven
& Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931). While scienter is not of the essence in
terms of affording equitable relief from reliance on material misstatements, Bloomquist v. Farson, 222 N.Y. 375, 380, 118 N.E. 855, 856 (1918), the Supreme Court has held scienter
indispensable to S.E.C. enforcement actions under Rule lOb-5. S.E.C. v. Aaron, 446 U.S. 680
(1980).
115. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
116. 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977). The availability of a state remedy is not dispositive of
whether Congress intended to provide a remedy. Id. at 478.
117. Id. at 480 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 480 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Id. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring).
119. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
120. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976 & Supp. V 1983).
121. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
122. 441 U.S. at 717.

weigh the factors.1 2 3 However, it must be noted that the Court attributed to Congress knowledge of thirteen decisions inferring private rights of action from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which was Congress' principal model for the later Title IX. This presumed knowledge was said to "reflect" legislative "intent with respect to Title IX.' 4 Thus, the presumption that Congress perceived
judicial activity under a statute became a principal premise from
which to extrapolate not only legislative ratification of such decisions, but also silent incorporation of their holdings in a later, but
related, statute.
Justice White could not agree with this analysis. He could discern no intent "to provide a new private cause of action. '1 25 However, he fairly disclosed prior disinclination to infer a private right
from Title IV 2 ' and restated principled opposition to holdings that
either of Titles VI or IX implies a private cause of action.1 27 Turning
to the majority's view that "nonetheless" a private cause is inferable
from Title IX "because prior to its enactment several lower courts
• . . entertained suits to enforce . . . Title VI," Justice White wrote
that "an erroneous interpretation of Title VI should not be compounded through importation into Title IX under the guise of effectuating legislative intent." 2 " However, he gave room for later maneuver by observing that Title IX's legislative history lacked any
clue that Congress was either aware of Title VI's judicial history or
"much less that it adopted the particular theory relied on" in prior
decisions.1 29
Justice Powell's dissent is impressive for its research and
thoughtfulness. He belatedly asserted that the Cort analysis "cannot
be squared with the doctrine of separation of powers.' ' 0 Yet, he did
not deny judicial power to entertain private suits asserting causes of
action implied by statute. Rather, he denounced the practice of in123. Id. at 709.
124. Id. at 697-98.
125. Id. at 718 (White, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 719,
127. Id. at 720-28.
128. Id. at 726. This recognition is remarkable due to Justice White's presence among
the Merrill Lynch majority. See infra notes 256-263, 248 and accompanying text.
129. Id. Curiously, the same sort of rhetoric appears in Jackson Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, 457 U.S. 15, 27 n.9 (1982), in which the Court,
subsequent to Curran, unanimously denied that section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (Supp. 1981), implied a private cause of action. Does
this validate law students' long suspicion that certain appellate courts often reach a decision
and assign their clerks the task of rationalizing it? At least one student concluded that the
Curran majority spoke to "what should have been the legislative intent." Comment, Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran: Establishing An Implied Private Right of
Action Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 815, 832-33 (1983).
130. 441 U.S. at 730 (Powell, J., dissenting). Cf. concurrence in Jackson Transit Authority, 457 U.S. at 29-30 (O'Conner, J., concurring).

dulging in inferences of jurisdiction "[a]bsent the most compelling
evidence of affirmative congressional intent." ' He questioned the
legitimacy of the Court's continuing reliance on Rigsby.13 2 In retrospect, this questioning was inadequately developed. Justice Powell
consigned Borak to the"aberrant" category reserved for decisions
"incomprehensible as a matter of public policy. 133 Calling for a
fresh start, he gratuitously opined that courts should be "especially"
reluctant to volunteer enforcement services when Congress expressly
provides other mechanisms to acquit the rights and duties it has
created.13 4
D. Refining Cort
Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington a3 occasioned an implicit denial of the Kardon suggestion that defendants are burdened to negate what the "general law" implied.1 36 Writing for a seven to one
majority, Justice Rehnquist denied any potential for weighting the
Cort factors equally since the "central inquiry" is oriented to congressional intent.1 3 7 He characterized the first three Cort factors as
traditional tools appropriate to identifying and implementing congressional intent.138 However, "analysis must begin with the lan13 9
guage of the statute itself.
Section 17(a) of the '34 Act 14 was in issue. It mandated that
national securities exchanges and various other participants in the
securities trading service industries maintain records and disseminate
reports pursuant to rules promulgated by the S.E.C. 4 1 "in the public
interest, for . . . protection of investors, or otherwise" to serve the
purposes of the Act. Thus, like sections 10(b) and 14(a), section
17(a) of the '34 Act is an empty basket. Unlike them, it does not
indulge the "unlawful" prologue. Defendant auditors were alleged to
have used improper audit techniques. As a result of this alleged improper technique, a regulated broker's falsification of financial reports went undetected for a period of time, ultimately setting the
stage for plaintiffis injury and damages. Justice Rehnquist recognized that, on the face of section 17(a), Congress intended to design
routine reporting techniques appropriate to accommodating those
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

441 U.S. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 732 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 736 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 749 (Powell, J., dissenting).
442 U.S. 560 (1979).
See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
442 U.S. at 575-76.
Id.
Id. at 568.
15 U.S.C. § 78 q-1 (1982).
15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1982).

charged with regulation.14 2 Unfortunately for future precedent, he
carefully undertook to reveal that the legislative history contained
"no suggestion whatsoever . . .that § 17(a) may give rise to suits
for damages" and styled this revelation as reinforcement for the ultimate holding against inference of a cause of action. 4 Because the
statutory language neither conferred rights on a particularized class,
nor described conduct as unlawful, and because the legislative history lacked support for plaintiff's thesis, "the inquiry ends there...
answered in the negative."14' 4 This unfortunately suggests the possibility of holding for a private cause if a statute, although silent in
otherwise material particulars, describes conduct as "unlawful," 1'45
addresses protection of a class, or is grounded in legislative history
suggesting availability of remedies to private suitors.
Plaintiffs in Touche Ross urged Borak and section 27 of the '34
Act as grounds for favorable decision.146 Although Justice Rehnquist
explicitly rejected the suitability of section 27's jurisdiction, venue
and process provisions as a predicate for inferring a cause of action,
he failed to acknowledge that the Borak anomaly rested on section
27.147 Indeed, he carefully avoided overruling Borak and respected
apocryphal attribution of its holding to section 14(a) of the '34 Act.
Interestingly, the Borak exegesis on 14(a) focused on a standard of
delegation quite similar to that in section 17(a). Happily, however, it
was announced that the Court has a "stricter standard" than in the
days of the Borak holding:14 8 "The ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks it can improve
upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law.' 1 49 Although concurring in the majority opinion, Justice Brennan contributed the happy thought that, when the first two Cort factors 150 are
answered in the negative, "the remaining two" cannot, by themselves, be a basis for implying a right of action. 51 The "remaining
two" are consistency of a remedy "with the underlying purposes of"
legislation and traditional relegation of "the cause of action" to state
1 52
law.
142. 442 U.S. at 570.
143. Id. at 571. Justice Rehnquist also recognized that § 18(a) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78r(a) (1982), expressly provides a private cause of action for false reporting.
144. 442 U.S. at 576.
145. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
146. See supra 92-102 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 98.
148. 442 U.S. at 578.
149. Id.
150. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
151. 442 U.S. at 580 (Brennan, J., concurring).
152. Thus, it appears that the third and fourth Cort factors have utility only as a complement to an affirmative answer elicited by the second factor; i.e., is there an indication of
legislative intent either to create or deny a "remedy"? See supra note 105 and accompanying

Within months of the Touche Ross decision, Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis1 53 provided the next opportunity to refine or revise Cort. But for the Court's closely divided
opinion and what has happened since, TAMA would be relatively
unremarkable. Section 206 of the Investment Advisor Act of 1940154
characterizes various types of conduct as "unlawful" but does not
describe a private cause of action. 155 Enforcement of the section is
clearly within the duties of the S.E.C. Section 215156 voids contracts
that violate the Act. 157 Thus, it is analogous to section 29(a) of the
'34 Act,15 8 which was the point of departure for the Geismar
extrapolation. 159
In TAMA, the plaintiffs alleged breach of fiduciary duties and
sought both equitable and legal relief. Maximum allowance of plaintiff's prayers would have entailed restraint of defendant's further
performance under an existing advisory contract, its rescission, restitution of consideration paid by the plaintiff and an accounting for
illicit profits as well as damages. 1 0 Justice Stewart wrote for the
majority that, by "declaring certain contracts void, § 215 by its
terms necessarily contemplates that the issue of voidness . . . may
be litigated somewhere."1 Citing Kardon and other decisions of
federal courts that construed comparable provisions, the majority
had little difficulty concluding that the availability of rescission and
allied equitable relief is necessarily inferred from section 215 in the
context of Congress' purpose to establish "federal fiduciary standards." ' Distinguishing between a theory of action and jurisdiction
to afford a remedy, the Court could not detect legislative purpose to
provide a legal remedy in either the statute or legislative history. 163
Thus, although plaintiff's prayer for damages was unsatisfied, the
Court continued to validate recourse to legislative history although
the statutory language was unambiguous. The TAMA majority explicitly honored the Touche Ross refinement of Cort1" while purporting to respect the Cort focus on remedies. 1 5
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens joined in a dissent writtext.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

444 U.S. 11 (1979).
15 U.S.C. § 80b-I (1982).
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1982).
15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1982).
15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1982).
15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982).
See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
444 U.S. at 14.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 20-22.
Id. at 15. See supra notes 136-138 and 149-151 and accompanying text.
444 U.S. at 23.

ten by Justice White. He maintained that each of the Cort factors
served access to legal relief. Unfortunately, he cited Rigsby for the
proposition that the Court "has long recognized that private rights of
action do not require express statutory authorization." 10 6 Amusingly,
a footnote butressed the proposition that Rigsby "marked the first

time this Court implied a private right of action."

'7

This might be

taken literally as an admission against the dissenters' interest. The
same footnote admitted that Rigsby spoke to a process which "had

been a feature of the not infrequent common law."' 68 The essence of
Justice White's dissent is, however, the thought that recognition of
the plaintiff's membership in a protected class demands the inference
that all appropriate remedies are available absent a demonstration of
controlling legislative intent to foreclose them. Kardon6 9 and Groesbeck1 70 are among the authorities relied upon by Justice White. Of
course, Kardon and Groesbeck were decisions concerning availability
of equitable relief. Their holdings, albeit not their rhetoric, are compatible with the TAMA majority.
Among other things, TAMA stands for the resurrection of the
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius17 in sharp opposition to
the extrapolation of intention to afford one mode of relief from ex166. Id. at 26 (White, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 26 n.2. Once again, the authors wonder if this constitutes a freudian slip.
Surely, some inferior courts are convinced that it is the Court rather than Congress which has
taken to implying private rights of action. Note the deferential reference in Basile v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to "the Supreme Court's reluctance to imply" rights
broader than those provided by Congress. 551 F. Supp. 580, 584 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
168. 444 U.S. at 26 n.2.
169. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
171. A time-honored canon of statutory construction, "expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another" has been a considerable victim of federal courts' rush to infer private
rights of action from remedial legislation unless, as in Hewitt-Robins Inc., v. Eastern Freightways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84, 89 (1962), confronted with evidence that provision of a private remedy would be "inconsistent with" legislative purpose. In Potomac Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 475 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. National R.
R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R. R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974), the circuit
court explicitly refused to honor the expressio unius maxim in a context of inferring a private
right of action for passengers despite express provisions for suits by railway employees and the
Attorney General of the United States. 475 F.2d at 332. The court, unconsciously emulating
an Orwellian projection, reasoned that Congress treated of employees and the Attorney General only to assure that employees have standing broader than other potential plaintiffs, id. at
333, and that the federal officer could invoke "what otherwise might be viewed as private
rights." Id. at 332. While the court went to unusual lengths in its rationalization of a power to
extrapolate jurisdiction, the evolutionary progress of implied rights of action has not been
marked with great concern, other than through the lip service of sometime distinction, with the
theory that Congress' express provision of private rights and remedies in circumstances particularized in a statute exhausts the legislative intent as to private rights and remedies. See, for
example, the inference of private rights of action concerning alleged breaches of S.E.C. Rules
lOb-5 and 14a-9 remarked at note 109 see also supra text accompanying notes 92-104 (which
inferences were not deterred by the '34 Act's express provisions of four classes of private rights
of action). However, that the Court seemingly once again esteems expressio unius is suggested
by TAMA, 444 U.S. at 17, Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 572, and Universities Res. Ass'n v.
Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 773 (1981).

plicit provision of quite a different remedial mechanism, despite
sub172
triumphal.
lastingly
not
is
revival
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sequent proof
In 1981, Universities Research Association, Inc. v. Coutu 173 occassioned a return to unanimity. The setting was the Davis-Bacon
Act 174 and the facts were curious. Government procurement programs obligate various contractors and subcontractors to pay "prevailing wages" determined by the Labor Department. The contracting officers of procurement agencies determine whether the
parameters of given contracts trigger payment of the "prevailing
wage." Frequently, the "prevailing wage" is not all that "prevailing"
and employees can be recruited to work for a lesser sum. The DavisBacon Act set forth the basic scheme and provides for appeals of the
contracting officers' determinations. A broad array of persons has
standing to appeal. When a contract compels payment of the "prevailing wage," it must authorize contracting officers to withhold so
much of those payments otherwise due to the contractor as is appropriate to cure contractor underpayments to protected employees. If
this withholding proves inadequate to bring affected employees up to
"prevailing" scale, they have the right to sue their employers and
those who posted required performance bonds.175
In Coutu, the Atomic Energy Commission was the government
procuring agency. A contract, under which Universities Research
was to provide services, provided that the prime contractor would
subcontract work subject to the Davis-Bacon Act. Consequently, the
contract required a pass-through of the Davis-Bacon obligation to
subcontractors. The prime contract did not trigger Davis-Bacon
wage scales for the prime contractors' own employees. Essentially,
plaintiff, for himself and on behalf of a class, argued that the prime
contract should have subjected the prime contractor to "prevailing
wage" strictures. Plaintiff also argued that members of the class
should have received "prevailing wages," if they could show that
they performed work governed by the Davis-Bacon Act.
Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court. Explicitly deferring to
Touche Ross, 17 he labored through the first three Cort factors.
"Nothing in the language, history, or purpose of the . . . Act" suggested a congressional intent compatible with the plaintiff class's
ambitions. 177 Prominent in discussion of "the language of the Act
itself," however, is the cause of action that is expressly provided for
the benefit of workers under contracts administratively determined
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See infra notes 211-56 and accompanying text.
450 U.S. 754 (1981).
See 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a (1976 & Supp. 1981).
450 U.S. at 758.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 784.

to be covered by Davis-Bacon. Existence of that cause of action triggered recognition that, when Congress wishes to provide "a private
damages remedy," it knows how to do so expressly. 1 8 This is a refrain familiar in implied cause of action holdings; however, time
proves that it cannot be equated with explicit respect for the expressio unius maxim. So long as a majority must look to legislative history despite the unambiguous availability of an express cause of ac179
tion, expressio unius has resumed only a half-life.
Unanimity as to a result but four-to-one-to-four division as to
methodology, surfaced three weeks after Coutu was handed down. In
California v. Sierra Club,18 0 the Court unanimously denied that section 10 of the Rivers & Harbors Act of 1899181 implied a private
cause of action. The section prohibits impingements on "navigable
capacity of any of the waters of the" United States, except as specifically authorized by specified federal authorities. 8 2 Penal sanctions
are explicit. 18 3 Plaintiffs sought to enjoin water conservation and distribution measures planned by California.
Justice White wrote for himself and for Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and, nominally, Stevens. Justice Stevens wrote a
separate concurrence in which he noted a disposition to honor plaintiff's theory but a conviction that "it is more important to adhere to
the analytical approach" adopted in Cort and Cannon."' That approach, as used in Sierra Club, proved unrewarding for plaintiffs because negative responses to "the first two Cort factors were 'dispositive'."' 8' 5 The methodological majority produced an interesting
formulation of the law of the case: "[T]he language of the statute
and its legislative history do not suggest that the Act was intended to
create federal rights for the especial benefit of a class of persons.
• . . Nor is there any evidence that Congress anticipated that there
would be a private remedy."' 8' Thus, happily, the Court retained a
distinction between right and remedy that is more than rhetorical. Is
this to say that a right will be inferred if either statutory language or
legislative history particularize a benefited class? Is this merely
graceful conclusory language or a groping back to a tort per se
theory?
Wonderfully, citation to Rigsby is omitted from even an earlier
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 773.
See supra notes 162-163 and accompanying text.
451 U.S. 287 (1981).
33 U.S.C. § 610 (1982).
33 U.S.C. § 403 (1978).
33 U.S.C. § 406 (1978).
451 U.S. at 298, 301 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 297.
Id. (emphasis supplied).

ritualistic recitation of the Cort factors. 187 Could the formulation's
flirtation with tort per se have been indulged to insure the joinder by
Justice Stevens?
His own view, abandoned in the interest of serving the "analytical approach the Court has adopted," keyed on "what Congress
probably assumed in 1890. ' ' 188 In 1888, the court rejected a private
petition to enjoin construction of a bridge across a navigable river.
According to Justice Stevens, the Rivers & Harbors Act of 1890 was
Congress' reaction to the 1888 decision. Based on this view of history, he expresses personal belief that "lawyers in Congress simply
assumed that private parties . . .comparable to [those in the 1888
case] would have a remedy for . . .injury suffered by reason of""8
the 1890 statute's violation. Butressing this belief is the recognition
of the undoubted fact that federal courts of the time routinely acted
as though possessed of the attributes of common-law courts.1 90 Sadly
for the 1916 Court, Justice Stevens cites Rigsby for the proposition.
In that case he finds support for rhetoric about the familiarity of
"implication of private causes . . . at common law and in American
courts" and legislators' presumed assumption that "federal courts
would . . .imply a private right."' 91 Is this a freudian slip or indifference? Quite apart from this is Justice Stevens' clear indisposition
to acknowledge that any such lawyerly assumption would have been
rooted in the midst of the intellectual climate induced by Swift v.
Tyson.1 92 Were it not for his respect for the majority's "analytical
approach," would he suggest that any federal legislation benefiting a
particularized class and enacted before Erie1 9 3 implies a cause of action remediable in federal courts? Surely, if the sense of "lawyers"
in Congress is determinative, "lawyers" in Congress before Erie
would have the same sense of the common-law implication of causes
of action in either 1890 or 1934. What of "lawyers" in Congress
after Erie? Should they not be assumed to know that federal courts'
common law generation abilities are limited either to generating the
187. Id. at 293.
188. Id. at 301 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis supplied).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 299-300 (Stevens, J.,concurring).
191. Id. at 300.
192. 41 U.S. (16 Pet) 1 (1842). During the near-century between Swift and Erie, federal courts exercising the diversity jurisdiction felt free to generate their own version of common law. Only in 1875 did Congress confer general original jurisdiction over federal questions
upon federal courts. 18 STAT. 470 (1875). See generally WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
63-77 (3d ed. 1976). Thus, the perspective of lawyerly legislators in 1899 surely would have
been shaped by an appreciation of 57 years of erroneous exercise of the diversity jurisdiction.
Did such lawyers, to the dubious degree their perceptions are pertinent, have the same perception as to the courts' first 24 years of deciding cases which arose "under the Constitution, laws
or treaties of the United States?" 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
193. Erie Ry. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

narrowly focused "federal common law" 9 4 or, sitting in diversity, to
applying the law of appropriate nonfederal jurisdictions?
Why do the authors concern themselves with Justice Stevens'
solitary apologia in Sierra Club? He wrote for the majority in Curran19 5 and his personal perspective is important to comprehending
Curran. However, other aspects of Sierra Club remain to be treated.
Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart and Justice Powell joined
Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in Sierra Club. The point was a
gentle but nonetheless explicit downgrading of the "so-called Cort
factors" to mere unequal "guides to the central task of ascertaining
legislative intent."1 96 As such, these factors do not demand that
courts "mechanically trudge through" the entire formula "when the
'
dispositive question of legislative intent has been resolved." 197
While one cannot say that an era of good feeling set in between
Sierra Club and Curran,neither can one say that the public enjoyed
heated debate.
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union"'8 and
Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.'99 dealt with attempts to have the Court hold that rights of contribution are either
implied by remedial statute or should be generated as part of the
"federal common law" under, on one hand, federal antitrust laws200
or, on the other, the Equal Pay Act of 1963201 together with Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.202 The decisions emphasized a
strong presumption that a remedy is deliberately omitted when Congress enacts comprehensive schemes including detailed procedures
for enforcement. They stressed the difference between construing a
statute in the context of ambiguous or "incomplete provisions" and
claiming authority to fashion a rule or to provide a remedy beyond
Congress' design. 0
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clam194. Hinderlider v. LaPlata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
The authors do not regard federal courts' power to elaborate and apply general maritime law
as a species of "federal common law".
195. See infra notes 211-257 and accompanying text.
196. 451 U.S. at 302 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 302 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
198. 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
199. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
200. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 15 (1982).
201. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1978).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1978).
203. 451 U.S. at 97; 451 U.S. at 646. Parenthetically, the authors' friends who variously
teach and practice maritime law are not charmed by the Court's relegation of "admiralty
cases" 451 U.S. at 641, and general maritime law, id. at 642, to "federal common law."
Would that the current Justices had time and inclination to study Justice Story's opinions in
DeLovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815), and Harden v. Gordon, I I Fed. Cas.
480 (C.C.D. Me. 1823).

mers Association °4 is not a different kettle of fish. However, Justice
Stevens wrote a separate opinion, joined by Justice Blackmun in
which he dissented in part.
Although they agreed with the majority that the Water Pollution2 °5 and Marine Protection Acts20 did not imply private damage
remedies, Justice Stevens recalled that "[d]uring most of our history,
a simple presumption usually provided the answer" to the question as to when "a person injured in violation of federal law should
be allowed to recover . . . in a federal court."2 7 The more detailed
answer is found in Rigsby's rationale but without explicit deference
to the Rigsby Court's recognition and use of statutory language consistent only with private right and remedy.2 08 As examples of "truly
conservative" thinking,2 0 9 Justice Stevens cited Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents 210 (usually cited for recognition of
a constitutionally implied cause of action); 21 1 Justice Frankfurter's
dissent in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public
Service Co., 212 Borak's gratuitous call to duty; 21 3 and, Kardon's rebuttable presumption in dicta that injurious violation of a statute is a
compensable tort.2"" He styled Cort as having "cut back on the simple common-law presumption. '215 Even though "multifactor balancing tests . . . tend to produce negative answers," Justice Stevens re204. 453 U.S. I (1981). Sea Clammers involved another circuitous deference to expressio unius: In the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional intent, we are compelled
to conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate. Id. at 15.
205. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1265 (1978).
206. 33 U.S.C. § 1401-1444 .(1978).
207. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text. Absent pre-1875 federal statutes'
specific grants of jurisdiction, "most of our history" must contract to the period between Congress' grant to federal courts of general original jurisdiction over federal questions and the
1938 announcement of the Erie and Hinderliderdecisions. See supra note 198. Surely, Rigsby
analyses cannot fill the void in light of Congress' undoing its dubious jurisdictional predicate
and the Romero Court's recognition that such predicate was unfortunate. See supra notes 1618 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens' nostalgia seems oriented to a day that rarely, if
ever, was.
208. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
209. 453 U.S. at 24.
210. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
211. Justice Stevens' specific citation was to language in a concurrence by Justice
Harlan. Id. at 402.
212. 341 U.S. 246, 261 (1951). However, itseems at least
arguable that the majority in
Montana-Dakota refused a "federal common law" theory.
213. J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964). Justice Stevens' specific citation
is to Justice Clark's call in gratis dictum for "courts to be alert to provide such remedies as
are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose." See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
214. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Despite
Justice Stevens' quotation in gratis dictum in the Kardon opinion concerning a "right to recover damages," the relief afforded was equitable accounting. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. Whether or not Justice Stevens' reference to Kardon was fair, Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder and S.E.C. v. Aaron would seem to burden generic reliance on Kardon. See
supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
215. 453 U.S. at 25 (Stevens, J., concurring).

ported that recently some members of the Court had been "inclined
to deny relief with little more than a perfunctory nod" to the Cort
factors.2 1 The authors infer that Justice Stevens would characterize
the perfunctory actors as untruly conservative. In any event, one
should remember that Justice Stevens' remarks ran to that part of
the majority opinion in which he concurred!
III.

What Does Curran Teach?

Curranand four companion cases2 17 were the subject of a single
decision by the Supreme Court. They arose out of the Maine potato
market-rigging scandals of the mid-seventies.
Starting in 1922, with a limited legislative treatment of certain
grains, 218 Congress enacted a comprehensive regulatory scheme for
trading in contracts for spot and future deliveries of a broad range of
commodities.2 1 Since 1974, the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)
has included provision for a Commodity Future Trading Commission
(CFTC). 220 The CFTC assumed powers formerly committed variously to a commission of three cabinet members and the Secretary of
Agriculture. Via various specific enactments, through the years concluding in 1974, CEA came to provide authority for regulation of
commodity exchanges and various participants therein. Additionally,
it came to grant administratively issued "cease and desist orders,"
injunctive relief at the instance of CFTC and two specialized channels of relief for various classes of aggrieved persons.
These specialized channels were engrafted onto CEA in 1974.
One required every "contract market" to provide an arbitration
mechanism for claims of less than 15,000 dollars. The other authorized CEA to investigate any person's complaint that specified classes
of market operators had violated the Act or regulations promulgated
thereunder. After investigation, CEA may refer appropriate matters
to an administrative tribunal and ultimately order reparations. These
orders are subject to judicial review.221
Plaintiffs invoked sections 4(a), 4(b), 5(a)(8), 5(d) and 9(b) of
the Act. 222 None of these expresses availability of a private cause of
action cognizable in or immediately remediable by a federal court.
Section 4(a) authorizes CFTC to promulgate rules limiting individual trading in or accumulation of futures contracts. 2 Section 4(b)
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
N.Y. Mercantile Exchange v. Leist, 456 U.S. 353, (1982).
Grain Futures Act, 42 STAT. 998.
102 S. Ct. at 1830-33, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
7 U.S.C. § 4(a) (1982).
7 U.S.C. § 7a(ll) (1982) (arbitration) and § 18 (reparations) (1982).
7 U.S.C. §§ 4(a), 4(b), 5(a)(8), 5(d), 9(b) (1982).
7 U.S.C. § 6a (1982).

indulges the "It shall be unlawful" rubric to strike at various species
of classic and constructive fraud in connection with commodities

trading.2 Section 5(a)(8) obligates each "contract market" to enforce its own rules concerning trading and contracts. 2 5 Section 5(d)
requires that exchange governing bodies against cornering or price
manipulation by operators in the exchange.226 Section 9(b) provides
penal sanctions for cornering, price manipulations or attempts to do
either. 2
Prior to the 1974 amendments, twelve courts are said to have
held that CEA implies private causes of action.2 28 However, one can-

not stop with a gross count. Seven or, possibly, eight held for implication by section 4(b), 211 one relied on section 5(a)(8), 30 another
drew nourishment from section 5(d) 231 and two inferred private
2 32
causes of action from section 9(b).
The leader from the post was Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co. 23 3 in
1967. In that case, a United States District Court unsurprisingly
heeded the Borak call to duty and the Kardon dicta concerning au224. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982).
225. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(8) (1982).
226. 7 U.S.C. § 7(d) (1982).
227. 7 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1982).
228. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 299-300 (2d Cir. 1980). The list provided by Judge
Friendly consists of reported decisions. Thus, it may be conservative. On the other hand, we
live in an age in which there is neither need for all dismissals by United States district courts
to be reported nor compulsion for federal appellate courts to report decisions. Indeed, it is not
unusual for circuit courts of appeals to direct not only nonreporting of a decision but noncitation of it as worthwhile precedent. Thus, the list of twelve reported decisions favoring inference
of private rights from CEA may be subject to either negative or positive restatement. In any
event, it is curious that neither Judge Friendly nor Justice Stevens saw fit to remark the gross
number of district judges sitting during the 1967-1974 period in which all of the twelve decisions - some are on an appellate level - were rendered.
229. Arnold v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 61 (M.D. Pa. 1973); McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. La. 1972), aftd, 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Arthur Epsey, Shearson Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Gould v.
Barnes Brokerage Co., 345 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Tex. 1972); Booth v. Peaney Co. Commodity
Serv., 430 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1970); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 238 F. Supp. 417 (N.D.
Cal. 1968), modified 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Goodman v. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp.
440 (N.D. I11. 1967); Anderson v. Francis 1. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn.
1968). Some of these landmarks are more interesting than others. Thus, in Gould, the court
seemed to be inviting repleading under the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 345 F. Supp. at 295. One only infers the Hecht district court's reliance on § 4(b)
from a paragraph drawing sustenance form Goodman. 283 F. Supp. 437. The main burden of
the district court's opinion in Hecht is debunking defendant's theory that CEA can be distinguished from the federal securities acts. Arnold and Goodman relied on § 286 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. There seems to be scant nourishment to be derived from detailed
review of these opinions. It should be noted that they succeeded Borak and predated Cort.
230. Deaktor v. Schreiber & Co., 479 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973).
231. Seligson v. New York Produce Exch., 378 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd
sub nom. Miller v. New York Produce Exch., 550 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
823 (1977).
232. See supra note 223; see also United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 311 F.
Supp. 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
233. 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. 111.1967).

tomatic implication absent statutory negation. The reeds upon which
the court leaned were the Restatement of Torts' teaching concerning
torts per se234 and a dissent in Wheeldin v. Wheeler.235 Thereafter,

Goodman was gospel and seven later decisions treated it as dispositive with scant comment. Regrettably, in terms of rationalizing Curran, the summary dispositions were sometimes operative as to statutory schemes other than that to which Goodman spoke. The times
and mores were such that litigants often pleaded CEA theories with
securities acts theories. Courts tended to concentrate on the latter
and to give CEA theories a quick nod of approval supplementing
endorsement of the securities acts theories.
As Curran and its companions worked their way through the
courts, they consumed extraordinary amounts of judicial time and
expression. In the Second Circuit, Judge Friendly's majority opinion
and Judge Mansfield's dissent occupy seventy-three extraordinarily
well-written pages.236 Predictably, Judge Friendly endorsed the implied causes of action.237
The burning issue came to be the relevance of pre-1974 decisions favoring implication by sections of CEA in the context of the
1974 amendments. One may easily stigmatize Goodman as a bad
decision before and after Cort. Most of the decisions which follow it
are essentially thoughtless indulgences in "throwaway lines." Congress added zest to the stew by enacting the Futures Trading Act of
1978 which authorized state authorities to bring actions parens pa2 38
triae for violations of CEA or CFTC rules.
The Supreme Court held for implication. The key element was
the presumed congressional perception of the pre-1974 decisions
favoring implications under four sections. Such a presumption neglected the need to examine correctness of such decisions. That they
predated Cort also became irrelevant. Ironically, although great reliance was placed on those decisions that are now thought untouchable
unless by Congress, none of them seems to validate inference from
section 4(a) which, of course, was of the essence in Curran.
Justice Stevens wrote for the Court. Justice Powell wrote a dissent in which the Chief Justice plus Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor joined.239
234. Id. at 447.
235. Id. Reference to Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963), was curious since it
was a vehicle for the Supreme Court's signal that it would not engage in a "free-wheeling"
creating of federal common law. Id. at 651. Consequently, the Court refused to acknowledge a
federal right of action for a congressional employee's abuse of subpoena power.
236. 638 F.2d 283 (1980).
237. See, e.g., Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 408 n.119 (1964).
238. 7 U.S.C. § 13a-2(l) (1982).
239. 465 U.S. 394 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).

Justice Stevens' remarks in National Sea Clammers signaled
his opening salvo in Curran:
"Our approach to the task of determining whether Congress intended to authorize a private cause of action has
changed significantly, much as the quality and quantity of federal legislation has undergone significant change. When federal
statutes were less comprehensive, the Court applied a relatively
simple test to determine the availability of an implied private
remedy. If a statute was enacted for the benefit of a special
class, the judiciary normally recognized a remedy for members
of that class. Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33
(1916). Under this approach, federal courts, following a common-law tradition, regarded the denial of a remedy as the exception rather than the rule.
(1) Because the Rigsby approach prevailed throughout
most of our history, there is no merit to the argument advanced
by petitioners that the judicial recognition of an implied private
remedy violates the separation of powers doctrine.240
Immediately supplementing this bit of nostalgia cum explosive conclusion is a very pertinent quotation from Justice Frankfurter's dis24 1
sent in Montana-Dakota Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co.
This led to a revelation that, while "the Rigsby approach prevailed,
. . . congressional silence or ambiguity was an insufficient reason for
the denial of a remedy for a member of a class a statute was enacted
to protect. 24 2 Justice Stevens demonstrated no recognition that Congress and the Court had struck at the jurisdictional underpinnings
for a Rigsby.243 He showed no understanding that membership in a
protected class was but one of the elements which dictated the result
in Rigsby. He betrayed no comprehension that another central element was statutory language about assumption of risk entirely foreign to an otherwise penal statute. 4 4
Justice Stevens fairly styled Cort as representing a decision by
the Court "to modify its approach" to the implication "question".
Unfortunately, the context of this modification descriptive is such as
to mandate an incorrect inference that the subject of modification
was Rigsby.245 Incredibly, he indicated that increased complexity of
240. Id. at 374-76 (emphasis supplied). As noted earlier, federal courts were not routinely possessed of federal question jurisdiction before 1875. The statute interpreted by Rigsby
was enacted in 1893. See supra note 20. Thus, on the fact of the matter, "most of our history"
per Justice Stevens is eighteen or forty-one or one hundred years depending on whether one
focuses on passage of the statute construed in Rigsby, the decision itself, Cort.
241. 341 U.S. 246 (1951). See also supra note 206.
242. 341 U.S. at 261-62.
243. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
244. Supra note 36.
245. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).

litigation and litigation volumes supported "more careful scrutiny of
legislative intent that Rigsby had required."2'46 This, of course, inex-

cusably ignored that the statute in Rigsby provided a glaring index
as to intent, an index which might well have satisfied Justice Powell 247 or the TAMA 24 8 analysis if implication - rather than tort per

se - was at issue in Rigsby. After all, assumption of risk 49 is an
affirmative defense in a personal injury action.
Ignoring the inappositeness of Justice Stevens' contrasts of Rig-

sby with Cort, he acknowledged that the "key to the inquiry is the
intent of the legislature. '250 Along the way, he does not fall abjectly
into a plodding Cort analysis. He does not proceed to legislative history per se. Rather, "the initial focus must be on the state of the law
at the time" new legislation was enacted.2 5' If courts have acknowledged a "private remedy" implied by an existing statutory scheme,
an amendment silent as to the existing implied remedy raises the
"question whether Congress intended to preserve the preexisting
2 52
remedy.
This leads to the recognition, without breaking down the sections of CEA, that "federal courts routinely and consistently . . .
recognized an implied private cause of action . . . to collect damages
for violation . . . of . . . CEA or rules" thereunder.2 53 Use of the
indefinite article before "implied" is fair at this point but becomes
entirely deceptive in context. First, "routine recognition of a private
remedy under" CEA prior to Cort is equated with "routine acceptance of an analogous remedy under the" '34 Act.2 54 The explicit
246. 456 U.S. at 377. This has been a theme sounded recurrently by those who stand for
liberally permissive inferences of rights of action. It would seem that focus on complexity of
legislation says too much. Surely, the Court is aware of the ample research and other staff
groups supporting Congress, committees of the houses, and individual legislators. Equally
surely, the Court is aware of the relatively limited facilities at its disposal and at the disposal
of the inferior federal courts. How is it that the federal judiciary, individual members of which
are not only comparatively impoverished as to staff but far more committed to calendar calls
than many, if not most legislators, can be presumed to be better able to divine latent legislative
purposes from complex legislation that the legislators are to make such purposes patent? Are
all branches of government equal, or one not only more equal but given gifts beyond those
committed to the run of humankind? Surely not. Surely, adopting Justice Stevens' idiom,
neither truly nor untruly conservative members of the Supreme Court can conceive of their
branch as constitutionally established as the paternalistic guardian of an only slightly incompetent legislature? Assuming that there is no such deluded perception, it seems that the Court
should avoid further evincing a desire to premise ability to infer jurisdiction on legislation
being so complex as to be beyond comprehension of the legislature. Surely, if the complexity of
its works spreads Congress thin, the Court poorly serves the commonwealth by developing a
rule that would burden Congress to respond to erroneous opinions of inferior courts.
247. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 749 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
248. 444 U.S. 11,15-16 (1979).
249. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
250. 456 U.S. at 377-78.
251. Id. (emphasis supplied).
252. Id. (emphasis supplied).
253. Id. (emphasis supplied).
254. Id. at 379 (emphasis supplied).

comparison is to Rule lOb-5 decisions. The contrast implies that
"routine" acceptance of one CEA theory is being compared to "routine" acceptance of Rule 10b-5 theories.
Plaintiffs in Curran relied on five very different sections of
CEA. The twelve decisions upon which Justice Stevens must rely for
his routine characterization are not twelve decisions as to a single
section.2 55 It is absolutely impermissible to compare them with a
string of decisions focusing on a single section of another act. If anything provides a substantive rule of decision in an implication setting, it is a given section rather than an entire act. An act may speak
loudly to a general purpose and its constituent sections may speak to
various particulars but, in the ultimate, one of those sections must
provide at least the beginnings of a substantive rule of decision.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, it is recognized that Justice
Stevens wrote for the Court. Thus, in material particulars, he wrote
the law and the impermissibility of certain of his methodology will
not, in and of itself, change the result. The result is suggested by his
observation that "it is abundantly clear that an implied cause of action under the CEA was a part of the 'contemporary legal context' in
which" the 1974 legislation occurred.2 5 Thus, Congress' failure to
tinker with statutory provisions under which "courts had implied a
cause of action is itself evidence that Congress affirmatively intended

to preserve that remedy. "257
Happily for the survival of the Cort analysis, there was some
additional evidence. Exchange representatives unsuccessfully sought
immunity for the Exchanges from suits alleging failure to enforce
their own rules.2 58 Some horse trading among legislators allegedly
occurred in the context of courts' continued ability to recognize implied causes of action.2 59
Having proceeded this far, Justice Stevens declined to "trudge"
further regarding the main issue. 260 However, he was not disinclined
to leap at the opportunity for redundancy. Of the CEA sections at
issue, only section 4(b) characterizes types of conduct as "unlawful"
and suggests classes of persons Congress intended to benefit. 26 1 Stating that Cort would not warrant the inference of causes of action
from sections other than 4(b), he obviously delighted in reaffiming
that a Cort inquiry is no longer afoot when one recognizes Congress'
255. See supra notes 221-225 and accompanying text.
256. 456 U.S. at 383.
257. Id. (emphasis supplied).
258. Id. at 384 n.72.
259. Id. at 384-85.
260. Id. at 388. One wonders if Justice Rhenquist's gentle concurrence in Sierra Club
451 U.S. 302 was meant to be taken as a needle and this is a misguided reposte. In any event,
Justice Stevens ultimately threw in affirmations of the final two Cort inquiries. Id. at 388.
261. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982).

intent "to preserve the preexisting remedy." '6 2
Assuming correctness of Justice Stevens' basic point regarding
Congress' presumed knowledge of decisions by ten or fewer district
courts plus two circuit courts, while ignoring the fact that their force
was spent on four sections other than the one examined in Curran,
his refusal to reexamine those decisions was correct. Continuing to
assume correctness of the point, we nevertheless must ask how many
decisions concerning a section of a statute constitute routine recognition, and how we are to recognize parallel sections for purposes of
implication?263

Justice Powell properly scorned the decisions that Justice Ste26 4
vens asserted were within the presumed perception of Congress.
Nonetheless, if presumed legislative perception of a judicial result is
central, Justice Stevens is correct and the poor quality of most of the
decisions is quite irrelevant. Unfortunately, Justice Powell wrote all
too summarily on the perception issue. He came to the brink of a
reductio but failed to deliver an express punch line:
This line of reasoning is inconsistent with fundamental premises
of our structure of government. Fewer that a dozen district
courts wrongly create a remedy in damages under the CEA;
Congress fails to correct the error; and Congressional silence
binds this Court to follow the erroneous decisions of the district
courts and courts of appeals.265
How can Congress perceive as valid a decision beyond the jurisdiction of the court which rendered it? Does Congress' perception run
to dictum?2 6 Is Congress presumed to know of all decisions inferring existence of a private cause of action or remedy, or to know only
of a series of decisions "routinely" making the same application? If
the latter, how many decisions make a series? Is there a district
court judge who shortly will hold that section 5(a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act implies a private cause of action? Are there
two? There has been one.267 Is substantial amendment of a regulatory scheme during pendancy of an appeal to become conclusive as
to the correctness of the last holding before appeal?
Curran must be undone. It is not enough to await vacancies on
262. 442 U.S. 66 (1975). Then, what of section 4a with no pre-1974 judicial recognition? What of sections 5(a)(8) and 5(d), each with one pre-1974 acknowledgement?
263. It seems that one may do. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
264. 456 U.S. at 395 (Powell, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 402.
266. See supra notes 75 and 98-104 and accompanying text.
267. Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976). Happily, this holding is
not susceptible to characterization as routine albeit part of the "contemporary legal context"
in which amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-48 (1982) were
accomplished. But, then, what was routine about pre-1974 holdings as to sections 4a, 5(a)(8)
and 5(d) of CEA?

the Court and chancy appointments, it is not enough to undertake
stimulating arguments regarding whether given amendments succeeding judicial inference of a private right of action are substantial
and regarding the "contemporary legal context" in which these
amendments occurred.
An essential point of a government of laws is predictability.
Curran equates ongoing legislation with roulette. It does so in the
cause of getting back to the days of Rigsby and endowing federal
courts with competence to generate a "federal common law" about
every subject upon which Congress legislates.
IV.

A Solution

The authors are persuaded of the utility of a statutory solution.2 68 However, they recognize that mere introduction of a bill is a
danger, lest the bill not pass. Thus, S. 3018 was offered by Senator
East in October 1982.269 Because of the short time left to the ninetyseventh Congress, it did not pass. Its part G provided against construing any act of Congress to infer a "cause of action at law or in
equity." Will an enlightened Curran ideologue now argue that S.
3018's failure to pass evidenced Congress' intent to encourage permissive inference of causes of action?
Trusting that such risk is minimal and confident of both the
courts' ability to impose traditional standards in equity 270 and the
private attorneys-general thesis, the authors propose the type of legislation in the appendix to this article. Application of the expressio
unius maxim to the proposal mandates the inference of jurisdiction
to afford equitable relief against violations of statutes although such
statutes omit express provisions for equitable remedies. Moreover,
agency rule-making could not provide the stuff of litigation between
private parties.
268. Were there assurance that all federal courts would conduct themselves with the
circumspection demonstrated in Walck v. American Stock Exch., Inc., 687 F.2d 778, (3d Cir.
1982) § 6 of the'34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1982) and Landry v. All Amer. Assurance Co., 668
F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982) § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1982), the
authors would not be as strongly persuaded of the need for curative legislation. However, the
analytical Judges Aldisert, Garzu and their fellow panelists of the Third and Fifth Circuits are
not a sample sufficient to project an ascendancy among the myriad federal judges. They are as
infinitesimal a sample of federal judges as the twelve decisions upon which the Merrill Lynch
majority relied were of routine decision-making. Interestingly, Judge Aldisert dealt with the
same section of the '34 Act which occasioned Judge Clark's gratuitous "dissent" in Baird v.
Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1944). Unfortunately, although eluding deference to Baird,
Judge Aldisert treated it as "recognizing" rather than subsuming a right of action implied by
§ 6 of the '34 Act. 687 F.2d 778, 787.
269. See supra note 26.
270. See, e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975).

Appendix
Section 101. This Act may be cited as the "Judicial Reform Act
of 1984."
Section 102. No provision of this title shall be construed to remove the jurisdiction from any district court of the United States
over actions, or parties in actions, filed with the court before the effective date of this Act.
Section 103. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no Act
of Congress shall be construed to grant to any party any cause of
action at law unless that Act expressly grants such a cause of action.
A district court of the United States may afford equitable relief
against or remedying otherwise irreparable harm caused persons by
violations of Acts of Congress oriented to protection of a class embracing such persons.
Section 104. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
rule or regulation promulgated by any commission, agency or other
entity to which Congress has delegated power to promulgate such
rules or regulations shall be deemed either (a) to give any private
party any cause of action at law or in equity against another private
party or (b) to constitute, either independently or as a supplement to
any Act of Congress, a rule of decision in trial of any case or controversy between private parties in a court of the United States unless
an Act of Congress expressly provides such cause of action or rule of
decision.
Section 105. Any petitioner who successfully prosecutes a cause
in equity, which cause was held by the relevant court or courts to be
necessarily implied by an Act of Congress, shall be entitled to judgment, upon and contemporaneous with entry of the court's final decree in equity, against respondent in an amount not to exceed the
petitioner's reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, immediately attendant upon such prosecution. Use of "final decree" herein
shall not prejudice either the right of respondent to seek reformation
of the order in a later proceeding or petitioner to collect and keep
said judgment even though reformation is subsequently granted.
Section 106. This Act will be effective on and as of

